Teaching Statement [PDF]
Numerical Teaching Evaluations [PDF]
Selected Student Written Evaluations [PDF]
Awards
UCLA Department of Economics Excellence in Teaching, First Prize, 2016
UCLA Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, 2015
Undergraduate courses I taught:
Economics of E-commerce and Technology
Weekly case studies on E-commerce and tech companies, competitive analysis, network effects, dynamic pricing, reputation
Additional Teaching evaluations [PDF]
Economics of Entrepreneurship
Idea validation, market sizing, business plans, valuations, pitching
Additional Teaching evaluations [PDF]
Market and Organization Design
One- and two-sided matching, deferred acceptance, Boston mechanism, top trading cycle, first- and second-price auctions, coalition formation
Additional Teaching evaluations [PDF]
Game Theory
Rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, sub-game perfection, adverse selection, moral hazard, evolutionary stable strategy
Industrial Organization
Bertrand and Cournot competitions, first-, second-, third-degree price discrimination, tacit collusion
Numerical Teaching Evaluations [PDF]
Selected Student Written Evaluations [PDF]
Awards
UCLA Department of Economics Excellence in Teaching, First Prize, 2016
UCLA Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, 2015
Undergraduate courses I taught:
Economics of E-commerce and Technology
Weekly case studies on E-commerce and tech companies, competitive analysis, network effects, dynamic pricing, reputation
Additional Teaching evaluations [PDF]
Economics of Entrepreneurship
Idea validation, market sizing, business plans, valuations, pitching
Additional Teaching evaluations [PDF]
Market and Organization Design
One- and two-sided matching, deferred acceptance, Boston mechanism, top trading cycle, first- and second-price auctions, coalition formation
Additional Teaching evaluations [PDF]
Game Theory
Rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, sub-game perfection, adverse selection, moral hazard, evolutionary stable strategy
Industrial Organization
Bertrand and Cournot competitions, first-, second-, third-degree price discrimination, tacit collusion