

Xinyu FAN

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References

Simon Board Professor of Economics, UCLA sboard@econ.ucla.edu (+1) 310-825-5304	Marek Pycia Associate Professor of Economics, UCLA pycia@econ.ucla.edu (+1) 310-794-3238
Tomasz Sadzik Assistant Professor of Economics, UCLA tsadzik@econ.ucla.edu (+1) 310-206-2833	Daniel Treisman Professor of Political Science, UCLA treisman@polisci.ucla.edu (+1) 310-794-5875

Interests

Applied Theory, Political Economy, Industrial Organization

Education

PhD in Economics <i>University of California, Los Angeles</i>	2012-2018(expected)
M.A. in Economics <i>University of California, Los Angeles</i>	2014
Bachelor of Economics and Finance <i>The University of Hong Kong, preparatory year at Tsinghua University, Beijing</i>	2012

Research

Elite Persistence, Power Struggle and Coalition Dynamics (Job market paper)

Why do social and political hierarchies often prove extremely difficult to eradicate? This paper studies the persistence of elites in coalition dynamics where players use their power to eliminate others and split resources. Our innovation is to allow players to give away power when they are about to be expelled, thus endogenously creating inequality in equilibrium power structure. We characterize the stable structures in general and study the robustness of equilibrium. Interestingly, perturbations on equilibrium structures exhibit the Mathew effect: power often ends up more concentrated to a few elite members regardless of initial perturbation making the elite stronger or weaker. We use our model to explain why revolutions that aim to install social equality quickly reproduce the same type of hierarchies that the revolutionaries sought to destroy. We also discuss how elite persistence is influenced by economic development, external threats and international cooperation.

Bureaucratic Control, Information Management and Governmental Responsiveness (with Feng Yang, under review)

When a superior officer and a subordinate jointly determine a noisy performance, and the superior

cares about his reputation among the audience outside the organization, promotion becomes a signaling tool for the superior. The superior can strategically postpone promoting a good subordinate to shift blame and enhance his own reputation. Moreover, the superior has more incentives to shirk when having the tools of strategic promotion to manipulate reputation, which decreases governmental responsiveness. We provide supportive evidence using data on provincial official turnovers in China.

The Economic Motives of Foot-binding (with Lingwei Wu, working paper)

How can economic incentives affect cultural practices? As a painful custom persisted in historical China, foot-binding targeted girls whose feet were systematically reshaped during early childhood. This paper models foot-binding as a pre-marital investment in the marriage market, investigating its emergence, diffusion, and decadence. Foot-binding emerged with a gender-biased shock in the elite recruitment system that made men's quality distribution more heterogeneous than women's. Foot-binding was then taken up as a tool to compete for better grooms and thrived as the elite recruitment system became a major channel for upward mobility. Foot-binding adoption in working class women also exhibited distinctive regional variation since it impeded heavy labor: it was highly prevalent in regions where women specialized in sedentary labor, and was less popular in regions where women specialized in farmland work. Both qualitative evidence and empirical analysis with the Republican China archives are consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Monitoring Dynamics in Fighting Corruption (work in progress)

When an anti-corruption investigator can take costly efforts to investigate both current and past actions of a potentially corrupt agent, he "signs a deal with the devil": he may turn a blind eye to corruption behavior in early periods, allowing the agent to build up punishable wealth, then use the threat of confiscation to enforce future good actions.

Investment with News Arrivals (working in progress)

When multiple firms compete to launch a new product whose market potential is unknown, firms may wait and acquire costly news to learn. We show that when the market only accommodates one product, the best firm always launches new product first. We also solve for the optimal launching time. When there are room for multiple products, the best firm may adopt a "wait and see" strategy: allowing others to test the product in the market, and entering later when the market potential is proven.

Teaching

Interim Instructor

Economics of E-commerce and Technology 2015, 2016

Industrial Organization 2014, 2015

Teaching Assistant/Associate/Fellow

Economics of Entrepreneurship 2015-2017

Economics of E-commerce and Technology	2013-2016
Game Theory	2015
Market Design	2016
Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory	2016
Intermediate Microeconomic Theory	2014

Teaching Reference

Edward McDevitt, Dept. of Economics, UCLA mcdevitt@econ.ucla.edu (+1) 310-825-3772

Awards

UCLA Dissertation Year Fellowship	2017
UCLA Economic Departmental Teaching Assistantship	2013-2016
UCLA Department of Economics Excellence in Teaching, First Prize	2016
UCLA Teaching Assistant Award	2015
UCLA Economic Departmental Fellowship	2012
UCLA Departmental Travel Grants	2015, 2017
HKU Foundation Scholarship for Outstanding Mainland Students (Full Scholarship)	2009-2012
HKU Dean's Honors List	2009-2012
HKU Worldwide Exchange Scholarship	2011
HKICPA QP Case Analysis Competition Winner and Best Presenter Award	2010
Tsinghua University Challenge Cup Research Competition, Third Prize	2009
Tsinghua University Departmental Freshman Research Competition, First Prize	2009

Conferences

Ronald Coase Institute Workshop of Institutional Analysis	2017
The 5th International Workshop on Economic Analysis of Institutions, Xiamen, China	2017
Economic History Association Annual Meeting (Poster Session)	2016
Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago, USA	2015

Services

Organizer, Theory Proseminar, Department of Economics, UCLA	2015-2017
Organizer, Lunch with Theory Workshop Speakers, Department of Economics, UCLA	2015-2017
Founding Chair, Rights and Interests Committee, CSSAUD, HKU	2010-2012

Personal

Date of Birth: 08/25/1989; **Nationality:** China